انتقاد بر نحوه اثبات قضيه عدم امكان اَرو به همراه آزمون تجربي دور و تسلسل و مبادله رأي

A Critical Review of the Proof of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem Along with an Empirical Test of Cycling an‎d Vote Trading

دكتري تخصصي

علوم اقتصادي

مركز تحصيلات تكميلي دانشگاه پيام نور

1404

1404/04/24

دكتر فرهاد خداداد كاشي

دكتر يگانه موسوي جهرمي

Collation, Redistribution, Cycling, Majority rule, impossibility theorem, Vote trading

Public choice faces fundamental difficulties. Arrow’s impossibility theorem highlights the inherent challenges that arise when attempting to aggregate collective preferences in a fair an‎d coherent manner. Alongside phenomena such as cycles an‎d vote trading, this theorem illustrates both the theoretical an‎d practical obstacles to preference aggregation an‎d the attainment of fair an‎d efficient collective decisions. In this dissertation, a critical analysis of the proof of Arrow’s impossibility theorem is presented, revealing its internal an‎d logical contradictions despite its foundational importance in social choice theory. With the aim of bridging the gap between abstract theories of social choice an‎d the complex realities of decision-making—particularly in the context of the Iranian economy—this study also investigates the existence of cyclical decision-making an‎d vote trading in Iran’s collective decision processes. To this end, data on the allocation of development budgets an‎d the distribution of budgets to medical universities across provinces are examined to assess the presence of cycles in budget distribution. Given that the variance of the aggregate provincial shares of distributed budgets exceeds the sum of variances from eight separate budget rounds, the findings indicate stability an‎d the absence of cyclical phenomena in parliamentary budget allocation. The observed stability an‎d equilibrium in real-world committees may stem from factors not captured by Arrow’s static model. Moreover, based on two cases reviewed by the Competition Council an‎d applying the Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) method, this study tests for the presence of vote trading within the Council. Although no evidence of explicit vote trading was found, the results suggest a lack of independence among the issues under consideration. Furthermore, the findings show that the personal characteristics of members exert greater influence on their voting behavior than the size an‎d significance of the organizations they represent.

1404/08/24

ابراهيمي

79286